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processes necessary to ordered society and often deprives others of remedies for harms they have suffered, courts hesitate to invoke the doctrine
in novel situations unless the purpose will certainly be served .... "'
This admission left the court free to grant the writ of mandamus compelling service of summons. It is submitted that this approach would
have been preferable as avoiding unwarranted expansion of the doctrine of diplomatic immunity. At trial, cases such as the principal one
could still be disposed of upon grounds of sovereign immunity, the
appropriateness of the United States as a forum for international
disputes, or forum non conveniens,"5 while simultaneously preserving
substantial justice for United States litigants. As pointed out in the
dissenting opinion, arguments for declining to exercise jurisdiction
of United States courts to decide cases such as the principal one
should not preclude service of process upon the intended defendant,
since the matters of competence or jurisdiction are defenses to be
raised at the option of a defendant, and therefore are inapplicable to
a question of service of process.2"

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COMPULSORY BLOOD
TRANSFUSION FOR ADULT JEHOVAH'S WITNESS
In two separate instances adult Jehovah's Witnesses were admitted
to hospitals with severe internal bleeding. Doctors in each instance
determined that blood transfusions were required to save the patient's
life. Each patient refused to consent to transfusions because of his
religious beliefs. In one case the patient, who had no minor children,
was pronounced incompetent, a conservator to consent to transfusion
was appointed by the court, and the transfusion was administered.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Held: An adult who
has no minor children cannot be compelled to take lifesaving blood
transfusions against his religious objection. In re Brooks' Estate,
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).' The other case involved a
father of minor children who was a patient in a veterans' hospital.
On the hospital's application for an order to authorize the transfusion,
24345 F.2d at 980.

25I n the principal case, both of the intended parties to the suit were foreign entities,
and the alleged event occurred in foreign waters. The difficulties in procuring witnesses,
enforcing judgment, and other similar problems bring forth the question of whether a
U.S. court is the proper forum to decide such a dispute.

26345 F.2d at 979.

134 GEo.

WAsH.

L. REv. 159 (1965); 44

TEXAS

L. REv. 190 (1965).
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the patient told the judge that he would accept a transfusion only
if the court assumed spiritual responsibility for the act. Held: Blood
transfusions to save the life of an adult parent of minor children may
be ordered over the patient's religious objection. United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).1
Limitations on the free exercise of religion are permissible only
when there is involved some overriding public interest.' Jehovah's
Witnesses regard blood transfusions as a violation of Biblical commands, and consider any attempt to compel transfusions as serious
infringement on their religious freedom.' Courts have consistently
overridden religious objection to life-preserving blood transfusions
for children,' but only recently has litigation raised the question of
whether such treatment could be ordered for adults.6 The principal
(unreported), 34 GEO. WASH. L.
- Appeal dismissed as moot, 2d Cir., Oct. 5, 1965
REv. 159 (1965). The government stated, however, in its motion to dissolve the order
and withdraw the complaint:
After timely examination of the laws of the state of Connecticut we could find no
cases or statutes making it a crime to refuse to accept a blood transfusion or failing to transfuse a mentally competent adult male who has refused to consent to be
transfused.
In granting the motion, the court made no mention of this statement.
3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The United States Supreme Court has
rarely applied the "clear and present danger" test in religious freedom cases, although
it was used in Sherbert. See Antieau, The Rile of Clear and Present Danger-Its
Origin and Application, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198 (1950). See also People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), and cases cited therein. In Woody,
the California Supreme Court reversed a conviction for illegal possession of narcotics
by Navaho Indians who used peyote in their religious ceremonies. The court stated
that free exercise questions required a two-fold test: first, how burdensome is the
application of the statute upon the free exercise of defendant's religion?; second, is
there some compelling state interest justifying this burden? The court distinguished
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which declared polygamy illegal, on
the bases that polygamy was not essential to Mormon beliefs and that the degree of
public danger was relatively high.
4 WATCHTOwER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLvANIA, BLOOD, MEDICINE AND
THE LAW OF GOD 3-8 (1961). Refusal of medical treatment on non-religious grounds

might also be entitled to constitutional protection. Judge Cullen, concurring in People
v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 212, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (Ct. App. 1903), said:
The state as parens patriae is authorized to legislate for the protection of children.
As to an adult ...I think there is no power to prescribe what medical treatment
he shall receive, and that he is entitled to follow his own election, whether that
election be dictated by religious belief or other considerations. (Emphasis added.)
E.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952) ; State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. detied, 371
U.S. 890 (1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). For a
discussion of these and other cases, see Cawley, Critinal Liability in Faith Healing,
39 MINN. L. Rav. 48 (1954) ; 24 U. PITT. L. REv. 642 (1963); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d

1138 (1953).

6E.g., Application of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
petition for rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964), 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 399 (1965) ; Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252
N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), 33 FODHAm L. REv. 514 (1965). See also 10 VILL. L.
Rmy. 140 (1964). Erickson was the first case involving compulsory transfusions for an
adult. A hospital's request for a transfusion was denied because the court concluded
that the patient was entitled to make the final decision to accept or reject a lifesaving
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cases suggest that the answer may turn upon whether the patient
has minor children.
In Brooks, in which it was held that the transfusion could not be
ordered, the court distinguished cases involving snake handling in
religious ceremonies,7 refusal to accept vaccination,' and polygamy'
because of the presence in each of an overriding social interest which
warranted restriction upon the individual's free exercise of religion.
The court also distinguished two cases in which blood transfusions
had been ordered for adults, one because the transfusion was given
to save an expectant mother's unborn child,'" and the other because
the patient had a minor child." The court concluded that no overriding public interest existed which would justify intervention when
the patient did not have minor children.' In George, in which the
transfusion was ordered, the court avoided discussing religious freedom by adopting the "rationale" of Application of Pres. & Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc. 3 In addition to the reasons given in
College, the court in George considered the possibilities of a detrimental effect upon the doctor's conscience, of violation of his professional oath, and that, if the doctor honored the patient's request
blood transfusion. The opinion did not state that the patient was a Jehovah's Witness,
but a letter from Judge Bernard S. Meyer to David Knibb, September 22, 1965, confirmed that he was. The letter stated further that it was unlikely, in view of the
patient's age, that he had minor children. Erickson was unmentioned in any of the
subsequent cases concerned with the question of transfusions to an adult, probably because it was not reported in advance sheet form until October, 1964.
7
Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) ; Harden v. State,
188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948), 2 VAND. L. Ray. 694 (1949).
8 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Although there was no indication
in Jacobson that religion was involved, public health measures have frequently been
upheld against claims of religious freedom. Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65
S.E.2d 848 (1951) (vaccination of child attending public school) ; State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wn. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952) (Christian Scientist denied
admission to university for refusal to take mandatory x-ray).
9 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
10 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
(per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), 33 FORDHAm L. REv. 80.
11 Application of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
12 It was contended in oral argument in Brooks that freedom of religion did not
permit one to endanger his own life. Judge Schaefer of the Illinois court is reported
as replying, "I can just see 100,000 Christian martyrs turning over in their graves
when you make that statement." Awake, Aug. 8, 1965, p. 14. Compare Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. Rav. 48 (1954) ; Ford, Refusal of Blood
Transfuisions by Jehovah's Witnwsses, 10 CATHOLIc LAW. 212 (1964) ; Comment, The
Right to Die, 9 UTAH L. REv. 161 (1964), with Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of
Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 860 (1965) ; Note, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 513 (1965). See also Address by Charles Mayo, head of the Mayo Clinic, to the
National Medical Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 11,
1965, p. 12, col. 1.
"s 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (hereinafter cited as College).
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by not administering a transfusion, such conduct would constitute
malpractice.
College was the only case in point considered in both of the principal cases. In College, a single judge had issued an emergency order
for a transfusion,"4 stating that the order was prompted by concern
for the patient's minor child, the possibility of subsequent liability
of the doctors or hospital, the transfer of spiritual responsibility from
the patient to the court, and determination "to act on the side of
life." The judge felt that the state was obligated to exercise its
powers of parens patriae to protect the child from "this most ultimate
of voluntary abandonments."'" Although a petition for rehearing was
denied,"0 none of the five judges who joined in opinions on that petition
addressed himself to the merits." The disagreement of the judges in
College suggested to the court in Brooks that a majority in College
might well have refused to order the transfusion. Nevertheless, the
court in Brooks indicated that it might have reached the same result,
and ordered a transfusion in the principal case, if minor children
had been present. In holding that a transfusion could be ordered for
an adult, the court in George noted certain similarities between that
case and College, 8 but failed to mention those which appeared to be
most relevant-both patients were parents of minor children, and both
had implied that the court might assume spiritual responsibility by
ordering the transfusions.
Parents have traditionally had an affirmative legal duty to support
their minor children." Minor children of the patients existed in both
George and College. Referring to this aspect of College, the court
in Brooks said, "The state might well have an overriding interest
in the welfare of the mother in that situation, for if she expires,
the children might become wards of the State."2 This suggested state
14 The order was issued under FED. R. Crv. P. 62 (g), which permits an injunction
during the pendency of an appeal "to preserve the status quo." For a discussion of the
procedures in College, see 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 706 (1964).
15 For an historical review of parens patriae, see Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J.
Eq. 517, 128 Atl. 254 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925) ; 4 PomFao-, E UITY JURISPRUDENCE 870
(5th ed. 1941). See also note 4 supra.
16 331 F.2d 1010.
17 One concurring judge thought the question was moot; another, that there was no
case or controversy. The dissenters considered the order void for improper procedure
and lack of justiciability.
18 The nature of the patients' ailments, the immediacy of the need for transfusions,
the religious basis for refusal, and the fact that both patients were Jehovah's Witnesses.
1) For a discussion of the various duties required of a parent, see Gill, The Legal
Nature of Neglect, 6 NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J. 1 (1960). See also UNioRaI
DESERTION & NoNsuPPoRT Act § 1.
20 205 N.E.2d at 440.
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interest is based upon a potential economic burden to society. Unless
this interest implies more than monetary disadvantage to the state,
however, it would seem erroneous in view of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Sherbert v. Verner 2 that a state may not inhibit
the exercise of religious beliefs by a denial or conditioning of state
benefits. If the cost of unemployment compensation does not afford
sufficient economic justification for impingement upon the free exercise of religion by the state, a fortiori the historic function of the
state as parens patriae of orphaned children is insufficient economic
justification for such impingement. A more plausible state interest may be that of the child's welfare.
However, the aspect of a child's welfare which would justify compulsory transfusion should be identified with greater specificity. If
the state interest is based on concern for a child's material requirements or the need for a family atmosphere, no justification for intervention exists because these would probably be supplied by another
Witness family. Although it is not universal, a widespread practice
exists among Jehovah's Witnesses of forming inter-family agreements
regarding the care and custody of children in the event of the parents'
death. Witnesses refer to themselves as the "New World Family," and
regard the obligation of raising children within this "Family" as being
so important that an orphaned child will be taken into a Witness home
to prevent the child from becoming a public ward.2
If the law is primarily concerned with the result of a patient's
refusal, i.e., his death24 and consequent "voluntary abandonment" of
his family, an even more basic difficulty arises. Laws directed at
abandonment, neglect, and similar social problems deal with families
which have already disintegrated. The converse is true in a Witness
family, where a high degree of solidarity exists.2" Consequently, an
U.S. 398 (1963).
Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CEi. L. REv. 426
(1953); Note, 25 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 711 (1964).
23 Interview with W. Glen How, Counsel for Jehovah's Witnesses, Seattle, Washington, October 15, 1965. Reports from public welfare agencies do not reflect these
practices because the records rarely include the religious affiliation of welfare recipients.
24 Aside from religious objections, Jehovah's Witnesses believe that blood transfusions do more harm than good. "The greatest fallacy in this entire controversy is the
bland, uninformed assumption that blood transfusion is necessarily a lifesaver. Nothing
could be farther from the truth" How, Religion, Medicine and the Law, 3 CAN. B. J.
365, 374 (1960). For a survey of medical reasons used by Jehovah's Witnesses to
fortify their objection to blood transfusions, see WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 16-38.
25 Jehovah's Witnesses believe that parental obligations are spiritual as well as legal,
and place special emphasis on the religious training of their children. WATCHTOWER
BIBLE & TRACT Soc~re,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 51-55.
21374
22 Cf.
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analogy to abandonment is inaccurate. Before the law extends its
supervision to an intact family, the right of that family to choose
and pursue its own values should be acknowledged. State intervention under these circumstances, unlike that which is justified when
a family unit has internally disintegrated, strikes at the basic structure of our self-governing, family-oriented society.
Since material needs and family environment will be supplied, only
a concern for intangible benefits deriving from the natural parentchild relationship might warrant overruling a parent's religious decision to reject lifesaving medical treatment.2" If the state interest is
solely in preserving these benefits to a child, the parent's decision
to reject a transfusion should be respected because the situation lacks
the degree of immediacy and certainty of harm required to limit
religious freedom.
When the court in George adopted the "rationale" of College in
ordering a transfusion, it perpetuated the failure to consider a question of both theological and constitutional import. The patient in
each case stated that, while he would refuse a transfusion, spiritual
responsibility for the act would rest upon the court if it compelled
the transfusion. It is difficult to ascertain whether the patient was
attempting to warn the court of alleged spiritual consequences of
ordering a transfusion, or attempting to compromise between his
religion and his natural fear of death. The difficulty is illustrated
by the reasoning in College, as the judge concluded that there was
no abridgment of religious freedom because a patient who did not
consent to a transfusion committed no sin. While Jehovah's Witnesses
do not believe they will be held personally accountable for a transfusion which they were compelled to receive, it is their position that
the law of God has been nonetheless violated. Thus, ordering a
transfusion over the patient's objection violates his right to the free
exercise of his religion, regardless of whether or not he will be
charged with a sin." The spiritual consequences for the person affected
by state action are no test for the constitutionality of such action,
since religious freedom is no less abridged because the law "accepts"
spiritual responsibility for the abridgment."
See note 4 supra.
An analogy is drawn between a patient forced to take the transfusion and a rape
victim. While the latter is not considered as having committed adultery, the rights of
the individual have nonetheless been violated. Interview with W. Glen How, Counsel
for2 Jehovah's Witnesses, Seattle, Washington, Oct. 15, 1965.
8 It could hardly be argued that no abridgment would occur if the state prohibited
worship services on the basis that would-be worshippers would be absolved from religious sanction because of their inability to worship. 9 UTAH L. REv. 161, n. 47 (1964).
23
27
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The suggestion made in George, that the conscience of the doctor
and the possibility of malpractice might be factors in the balancing
process, is of doubtful validity. While members of the medical profession are in sharp disagreement on the ethics of acceding to the
wishes of Jehovah's Witnesses," no state interest is represented by
the doctor's conscience" and no legal duty could rest upon the doctor
to provide treatment in violation of the patient's directions." Absent
a court order,32 it would be malpractice for a physician to administer
a transfusion over the objection of the patient." By suggesting that
it would be malpractice not to give the transfusion, the court failed
to recognize that the logical development of its suggestion would be
to have liability for malpractice arise from a failure to commit
malpractice.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

-DENIAL

OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Plaintiffs, a labor union and two of its members, sought a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring all
private contractors performing work for the city to employ only residents of the county in which defendant municipality was situated.' On
29 A panel discussion among physicians of the University of Pennsylvania School of
Medicine, reprinted in Fitts & Orloff, Blood Transfusion and Jehovah's Witnesses, 108
SURGERY,
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 502 (1959), illustrates this disagreement.
30

The Hippocratic Oath contains no clear answer for a physician. It has been
interpreted to mean that the doctor must be a physician of the soul no less than of the
body, and must consider the moral implications of his treatment. EDELSTEIN, THE

HipPocRATIc OATH-TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 24 (1943).
3' It was suggested in College that the doctors might have an obligation to operate
to avoid criminal liability. In spite of a statement in SHAR17L & PLANT, THE LAW OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE 371 (1959), suggesting the contrary, there is no duty to provide
treatment against the patient's request. Otherwise, the physician would be under a
legal duty to commit assault and battery. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 553 (1959).
32 For a discussion of the applicability of the doctrine of implied consent to transfusion cases, see Comment, 9 UTAH L. REv. 161 at 164 (1964). But see 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 399 (1965). See generally PROSSER, TORTS 104 (3d ed. 1964). The patient in
George had executed a civil release in the form approved by the Board of Trustees of
the American Hospital Association. See also Hospitals, Journal of the Amer. Hosp.
Ass'n,
33 Feb. 1, 1959, p. 46.
This is commonly considered assault and battery. PRossaR, TORTS 104 (3d ed.
1964). Assault and battery is incorporated with negligence into the larger classification of malpractice. See Physicians' & Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wn. 2d
38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941) ; Kelly, The Physician, The Patient, and The Consent, 8 KAN.
L. REv. 405 (1960) ; Steincipher, Survey of Medical Professional Liability in Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 704 (1964).

' The court does not quote the ordinance, but states, Construction Union v. City of
St. Paul, 134 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1965):
The ordinance involved compels all contractors who are performing work for the

